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MMSO23

Wednesday, January 11 2023

2 p.m. — Åsa Burman (Stockholm University) — Nonideal Social Ontology

This talk starts from the observation that there are two different research frames within contemporary social ontology. It argues that the key questions and central dividing lines within contemporary social ontology can be fruitfully reconstructed as a clash between two worlds, referred to as ideal and nonideal social ontology. Ideal social ontology is characterized by consensus and cooperation, while nonideal social ontology is characterized by conflict and contestation. I characterize ideal social ontology by developing the standard model of ideal social ontology (the dominant version of ideal social ontology). The standard model is exemplified by the works of Margaret Gilbert, John Searle, and Raimo Tuomela. This model thus synthesizes central assumptions from the three works that shaped the research field of ideal social ontology and shows their explicit and implicit assumptions about social reality. This standard model has a crucial implication: it has shaped what social ontologists understand the social phenomena to be analyzed to be—direct, transparent, and deontic social phenomena built on consensus. Consequently, this model offers only a partial view of the social world while claiming it is general. I then argue for the use of nonideal theory in social ontology. My central claim is that a paradigm shift is underway in contemporary social ontology, from ideal to nonideal, and that this shift should be fully followed through (Burman 2023).

3 p.m. — Maryam Ebrahimi Dinani (Jean Nicod Institute) — Social institutions and two types of underlying principles

The aim of this talk is to introduce a distinction between two types of principles underlying institutional practices: principles which reveal the raison d’être of institutional practices, and principles which determine the obtaining and functioning of institutional entities. I will start by telling a story of levelling in order to make the distinction tangible: I will suggest that essential principles pertain to the relation between institutional practices –such as competitive games and marriage– and the underlying values and functions, in view of which they emerge. When these practices are institutionalized in one form or another –French marriage, chess, etc.– we pass through definitional principles, which pertain to the instantiation conditions of the practice in a particular form, against the background of its essential rules. I will then argue that although the truth of definitional principles is contingent on their being operative in a certain context, the truth of essential principles is independent of their operativeness and, a fortiori, independent of our representations and attitudes. After introducing the notion of essentially-social acts as those which require joint attitudes for their possibility, I will focus on communicative [speech] acts as a subset of essentially-social acts and argue that certain communicative acts like promising and commanding belong, as kinds, to the institutional realm even though they are not in need of definitional principles for their instantiation.

4 p.m. — Asya Passinsky (Central European University) — Ameliorative Metaphysics

In recent years, ‘ameliorative’ projects have become popular in social metaphysics. Such projects have been pursued for a wide range of social phenomena, including gender, race, sexual orientation, and misogyny. Yet the very idea of an ameliorative metaphysics is puzzling. On the one hand, normative and political considerations are supposed to be relevant to ameliorative inquiry. On the other hand, metaphysics is supposed to be a value-neutral descriptive endeavor. In this talk, I consider and reject some extant proposals for how to make sense of ameliorative metaphysics. I then propose a new way of understanding this sort of project within a broadly neo-Aristotelian conception of metaphysics.
 

 

5 p.m. — Brian Epstein (Tufts University) — Classification in metaphysics: limits and alternatives

 

 

Thursday, January 12

2 p.m. — Katharine Jenkins (University of Glasgow) — How To Be A Pluralist About Gender (Or Any Other Human Social Kind)

 
Gender pluralism (in the sense I’m interested in here) is the view that there are multiple different sets of kinds that are gender kinds – or, to put it another way, the view that there is no single kind that we can associate with a given gender category (such as the gender woman). One could also be a pluralist about any other human social kind in the same sense. Within the feminist metaphysics and social ontology literatures, various existing accounts of human kinds in general and of gender kinds in particular include endorsements of pluralism (Mallon 2016; Ásta 2018), but these are typically brief and lacking in detail. In this talk I advance on this by offering a systematic framework for pluralism about human social kinds, and applying it to gender. I then use this framework to defend a ‘radical’ form of pluralism about gender kinds, according to which there are multiple sets of kinds that are gender kinds and these include a variety of types of gender kind that are interestingly different from one another on an ontological level (cf. Spencer 2019, Jenkins 2019). I show that this pluralist account can avoid ‘the free-for-all worry’, which is the concern that gender pluralism results in an ‘anything goes’ ontology within which productive disagreement is impossible and people simply talk past one another. Finally, I situate this account in the current political context to highlight some advantages and defend against some possible objections.
 

3 p.m. — Matti Sarkia (University of Helsinki) — Social ontology as theoretical modelling

Theoretical modeling has been analyzed as a distinctive strategy of scientific investigation, which is based on the indirect investigation of the world by the mediation of a surrogate system, instead of studying the world directly, through empirical observation and experiment (Godfrey-Smith 2006; Weisberg 2007; 2013). Drawing on my earlier work (Sarkia 2021a; 2021b), I will argue that much (even if not all) research in social ontology may also be understood as theoretical modeling, where deliberately abstract and idealized surrogate systems are constructed for the study of the basic building blocks of the social world. Understanding social ontology as theoretical modeling makes it possible to better understand the types of standards of success that apply to it, and to identify new continuities between social ontology and the social sciences.

 

4 p.m. — Daniel Little (University of Michigan-Dearborn) — Can critical realists embrace ontological individualism?

Most critical realists would probably insist that their philosophy of social science is flatly opposed to any form of individualism. Roy Bhaskar and many of his followers emphasize the reality of social structures, a view about the reality of social causal mechanisms, a fairly strong form of emergence, and a determined opposition to methodological individualism. However, it will be argued here that CR rejection of reductionist individualism is unwarranted when directed at the position of ontological individualism. Ontological individualism is not a reductionist doctrine, but rather a view about the constitution of the social world. It maintains that social entities, powers, and conditions are all constituted by the actions, thoughts, and mental frameworks of individual human beings, and nothing else. The social world is constituted by the socially situated individuals who make it up. This ontology does not question the undoubtable fact that individuals have social properties — beliefs, values, practices, habits, and relationships — that are integral to their consciousness and agency. But these properties themselves are the recursive effects of prior sets of socially constituted, socially situated individuals who have contributed to their formation as social actors. The paper will demonstrate that the critical realist positions taken by Bhaskar, Archer, and Lawson can be fully expressed without loss within the ontological framework of ontological individualism. This finding enhances the antecedent credibility of critical realism rather than diminishing it.

5 p.m. —Muhammad Ali Khalidi (City University of New York) — Social Ontology or Metaphysics of Social Science?

Philosophers interested in the metaphysics of the social world sometimes appear to be pursuing two distinct projects.  One project involves understanding the domain of individuals, groups, artifacts, and other entities that populate our ordinary human lives.  The other project concerns the foundations of the social sciences, including the institutions, processes, and events that are studied in systematic inquiries in such disciplines as economics, sociology, and political science.  No doubt there is some overlap in the entities and kinds that are under investigation, as well as in some of the methods used in undertaking the two investigations.  But there are certainly some important differences of emphasis.  For example, among the kinds dealt with in the first project are ones like university professors, sports teams, department meetings, friendly walks, and screwdrivers, which do not seem to feature in the second project.  Meanwhile, the kinds investigated in the second project are those like consumers, inflation, government, recession, industrialization, and revolution.  Moreover, the methods of the first project tend to involve reflecting on and analyzing concepts that pertain to our everyday lives, and the results are answerable to commonly held beliefs or intuitions, whereas the methods of the second project require close attention to empirical work in the social sciences.  Finally, the conclusions of the two inquiries may well turn out to diverge.  For example, the first project might conclude that kinds have less determinate individuation conditions than the second project.  How should we attempt to reconcile these two projects?  Should the pursuit of “folk social ontology” be clearly distinguished from the “metaphysics of social science,” or should we try to merge the two enterprises, and if so how?

 
 
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